Using his training in psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and philosophy, Richard Chessick examines the special combination of hermeneutics and natural science that characterizes Freud's psychoanalysis and investigates what goes on in the mind of a psychoanalyst during the psychoanalytic process. The book's central thrust is that the focus of psychoanalysis must always be on intrapsychic conflict and that recent advances in theory and technique have strayed too far from what was valuable in Freud's work. It is written primarily from the perspective of the American school of ego psychology, with some reference to object relations and only a brief, dismissive comment on Lacan. Chessick is wary of the relational therapists and the intersubjectivists who focus primarily on the relationship between patient and analyst. The classical notion of the neutral therapist confronting the emotionally disturbed patient and making an objective diagnosis is contrasted with the contemporary practice of concentrating on the here and now relationship between the patient and analyst. He warns that the tendency to focus exclusively on the patient's perceptions of the analyst can be seen as intrusive and disruptive and may be "rightfully experienced as an impingement stemming from the analyst's own narcissistic needs." The author stresses the importance of the "relentless incorruptibility" of the analytic attitude and the necessity of not yielding to pressure arising from sexual and narcissistic demands of patients.
Given that most of the book concentrates on the past, outlining the philosophical underpinnings of Freud's thought, the title is somewhat misleading. In a chapter entitled "What Can Modern Psychoanalysis Learn from Medieval Psychoanalysis," he reviews some of the psychological ideas found in the Divine Comedy, examining Dante's medieval concept of a cure of the soul, which is similar to the goals of psychoanalysis. He explores the views of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Freud, all thought of by Ricoeur as practitioners of the "hermeneutics of suspicion." Chessick explains that the value of the practice of phenomenology to psychoanalysis is that it provides a focus on the role of the subjectivity of all knowledge of the world. He suggests that the concept of the "presuppositional inquiry," that is, an inquiry using no theories, is comparable to Bion's injunction to approach each psychoanalytic session without memory or desire.
In a chapter entitled "Understanding the Human Mind in the Contemporary World," Chessick challenges contemporary theorists of the mind, such as Cavel, who claim that the infant has no thought before communication. Clavel's position is that the human infant requires something extrinsic in the way of interaction with the external world before we can call it a self. Chessick's view is that the relativists see the baby's mind as a product only of linguistics or interpersonal relationships and they deny the presence of an ineffable private core of the self, known only to the person. This baby is employed as an organizational metaphor for clinical data and places the emphasis for change on a 2-person field. Freud's model of cognition assumes that the infant has a capacity for perception of specific objects and for recalling these objects in moments of need. In Freud's mind, the baby is capable of a prelinguistic imagistic form of thinking. This baby is riddled with conflict, drives, and passions. Chessick says this view is more similar to Nietzsche's conception of man, which is not buried in reason or logic but a dark vital instinct. This has implications for our clinical practice with respect to how we see fundamental change occurring. Chessick's view is that the archaic sadism or primitive irrational aspect of seriously emotionally disturbed patients can best be accessed through free association and transference. He feels that the treatment methods of the relational school would attempt merely to replace a malevolent introject with a benign introject or to plaster over it. Chessick is equally critical of the capacity of brain studies that try to make the leap from neuropsychological functioning to individual subjective personal experiences.
The author addresses the issue of what constitutes progress in psychoanalysis. He sees the move from a 1-to a 2-person psychology as representing not an advance in the field but merely a shift from a more authoritative to a more relativistic epoch. He recognizes that particular forms of psychoanalysis are prominent in a given culture because they are linked with the history and customs of that culture. Chessick expresses pessimism about the postmodern culture, which he describes with adjectives such as "moral nihilism" and "eliminative materialism." He questions how psychoanalysis can adapt to this a culture in which corruption is rampant without compromising its integrity and losing its ideals. He goes so far as to compare the decline of psychoanalysis to the disintegration of the Plato's Academy, which broke up into groups of quarrelling factions that failed to uphold Plato's doctrines. This is a book of broad and ambitious scope. It is a curious blend of reverence for the past ideals in psychoanalysis, a lament about psychoanalysis' present state, and useful reminders of the centrality of intrapsychic conflict. It would be of use to those practitioners who, faced with the complexity of patients in the consulting room, still rely on the explanatory power of psychoanalysis. While his discursions into philosophy seem at times tangential, he seems to be trying to make the point that Freud's deep grasp of the human mind is embedded in various strains of philosophical thought that should be preserved and respected.
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This is a very well written guidebook, yet I have grave reservations concerning its main message-namely, that our ultimate aim is to arrive at a DSM-IV diagnosis.
A classification system that is based on phenomenology, whose categories are still hotly debated, and have been altered under political pressure (as opposed to rigorous scientific data) hardly merits the kind of unconditional endorsement implicit in this volume's premise. However, pragmatism, expediency, lack of a better alternative, and certainly a reasonable degree of usefulness make us all open to this uneasy compromise.
The author is a supreme craftsman who uses this inadequate tool extremely well and guides us through the process of diagnostic decision making. He defines the fundamental concepts with great clarity, emphasizes the safety hierarchy (the rationale for his algorithm), discusses what principles to follow when sources of information conflict or are insufficient, and discusses how to handle the inevitable diagnostic uncertainty or data that we all should be alerted to as red flags-all in a lighthearted, entertaining yet scrupulously thorough fashion.
The exemplary layout-plenty of tables and figures to summarize the process just discussed-all contribute to this book's significant value as a teaching tool. The chapters on the interconnectedness of physical and mental states and the one on mental status assessment are simple, short, concise, and to the point.
It is probably the chapter on practical application, particularly examples like Andrea Yates (p 141), that demonstrate why this book-pragmatic as it is!-leaves us famished for deeper, more complex analysis; for more consideration of the dynamic relation among history, context, and personality, and how these might influence symptoms. Diagnosing is presented as a step-by-step exercise-akin to searching for the exit in a 2-dimensional labyrinth-instead of the striving to understand a complex human being. (I think this is the unfortunate and inevitable consequence of manoeuvring a phenomenology-based system.) It may well be beyond the scope of this book to define normalcy, but I would like to have learnt Dr Morrison's rationale for drawing the line at a particular place.
In the same vein, navigating the boundaries between normal and pathological seems subjective and arbitrary. The author appears surprisingly lenient in some instances-regarding social norms, for example (p 46, "Sandy")-yet he strikes us as unduly harsh at other times-for example, when he states that mood symptoms lasting longer than 2 months do not qualify as part of normal bereavement. (In this reviewer's understanding-and experience-grieving is the final chapter in a long and multifaceted connection and, as such, even in its simplest form, may defy the straightjacket of 2-months' duration. We used to consider 6 months as normal-which was just as arbitrary-if more in sync with experience.) Unfortunately, the chapter on diagnosing personality disorders-while it is lighthearted and flexible-still offers another demonstration of how inadequate DSM-IV really is. I hope that in a future publication Dr Morrison will be able to teach us how to use a new, more meaningful diagnostic system (see, for example, Schema Therapy by Young, Klosko and Weishaar, 2003) -one that will incorporate our emerging understanding of the development of maladaptive coping styles and respects the complexity of every human being.
